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Sturkey: South Carolina Constitutional Law

SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The State Education Assistance Act' designates the State
Budget and Control Board the State Education Assistance Authority and authorizes that body to make, insure, or guarantee
loans to students who are residents of South Carolina to defray
their expenses for post-secondary education. Under the Act the
Authority is empowered to issue bonds to raise funds for student
loans. The bonds are retired solely from monies obtained from
repayment of student loans or from direct federal grants and are
not a debt against the credit of the state.2 The constitutionality
of the Act was upheld by a unanimous court in Durham v.
McLeod. 3 The plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer, had challenged
the Act on a multiplicity of state and federal constitutional
grounds.
Plaintiff's first contention was that the Act served to support
sectarian schools in violation of article XI, section 9 of the South
Carolina Constitution.4 In 1971 the court in Hartness v.
Patterson held that direct tuition grants appropriated from the
general funds of the state for the purpose of aiding independent
schools of higher learning were unconstitutional as tending to
support religion. In Durham the court decided that this constitutional objection was overcome because all students may receive
educational loans under the Act, whether the institution is public
or private, sectarian or secular. Although the Act provides aid to
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-96 to -96.17 (Cum. Supp. 1971), hereinafter referred to as
"the Act."
2. Id. §§ 22-96.7, -96.15. All money received to the credit of the Authority is held in
trust for the sole purpose of educational assistance loans. Students receiving assistance
are authorized to attend public or private schools either in South Carolina or some other
state.
3. 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972) (per curiam), appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W.
3456 (Jan. 24, 1973) (No. 72-1026).
4. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 9, reads in part:
The property or credit of the State. . . or [of any] other subdivision of the...
State, or any public money, from whatever source derived, shall not, by gift,
donation, loan, contract, appropriation, or otherwise, be used, directly or indirectly in aid or maintenance of any college, school. . .or other institution. ..
which is wholly or in part under the direction or control of any church or of any
religious or sectarian denomination, society, or organization.
5. 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.E.2d 907 (1971).
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higher education, that aid does not directly support any institution. More importantly, "[Tihe student loan fund under the Act
is held by the Authority as a trust fund, and. . no public money
or credit . . isemployed in making or guaranteeing loans." '
The plaintiff also averred that tuition loans under the Act
violated the establishment clauses of both the State and Federal
Constitutions.7 The court, however, upheld the validity of the
Act, reasoning that it met the tripartite test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman.8 In Lemon the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that authorized state
salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in non-public
schools. Because of the continued state supervision and administrative intermeddling necessitated by the statute, the Supreme
Court held it unconstitutional on the facts. The Court enunciated
three tests: First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose;' second, the primary effect of the statute must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, the statute
must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.'"
In Durham the plaintiff conceded that the purpose of the Act
was secular and that the Act did not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. Because it focused on the
student-recipient rather than the institution, the Act also met the
final test by not promoting or inhibiting religion. In the court's
opinion the Act is "scrupulously neutral as between religion and
irreligion and as between religions. It simply aids and encourages
South Carolina residents in pursuit of higher education, and
leaves all eligible institutions free to compete for their attendance
and dollars.""
It is interesting to note that the court did not mention Hunt
v.McNair.2 In a comprehensive opinion in Hunt, the court advanced the same rationale adopted in Durham to uphold, against
establishment clause objections, state revenue bond financing for
6. 259 S.C. at 413, 192 S.E.2d at 204.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9. Id. at 612. See also School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963).
10. 403 U.S. at 614; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
11. 259 S.C. at 413, 192 S.E.2d at 204.
12. 258 S.C. 97, 187 S.E.2d 645, prob. jur. noted, 93 S. Ct. 223 (1972) (No. 71-1523),
noted in 24 S.C.L. Rav. 634, 643 (1972).
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private colleges under the Educational Facilities Authority Act.1 3
Hunt is currently awaiting decision on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
In Moore v. Board of Trustees of CharlestonCounty Consoli4 the Federal District
dated School District,,
Court for the District
of South Carolina considered the ramifications of tuitionsupported, voluntary summer school programs conducted in public secondary educational facilities. The indigent plaintiff,
mother of two sons who had failed courses in which they were
enrolled during the regular school term, brought a class action
contesting the validity of tuition-supported summer school programs. The court, in dismissing the complaint and denying the
plaintiff's motion to restrain the collection of tuition fees, noted
that no statutory authority exists for the maintenance of summer
school programs. Those programs are not a part of the regular
school year and are not funded by either state or local school
district taxes. Teachers are paid exclusively from funds generated
by the tuition charged. The extent of state support is therefore
limited to providing school facilities and janitorial services. 5
There is no constitutional provision specifically requiring
free schools in South Carolina or the nation.'" Education is thus
not a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens, but is rather
in the nature of a substantive right implicit in the liberty assured
by the due process clause.17 Where resources are finite-and this
was conceded by the plaintiff-the action of the state need only
be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.'" Noting that tuition fees for summer school were assessed in order that
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-41 to -41.17 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
14. 344 F. Supp. 682 (D.S.C. 1972).
15. By emphasizing these facts the court insouciantly implied, without so holding,
that there was insufficient state action upon which to base an equal protection argument;
see 344 F. Supp. at 687.
16. Id. at 684.
17. Id. at 687; cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278
(1973), in which the Supreme Court recently stated:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not
alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard of reviewing a State's
social and economic legislation. Id. at 1297-98.
18. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), in which the Court held that a
state-imposed ceiling of $250 per family, regardless of family size, for Federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children was rational and permissible because the ceiling was
dictated by finite welfare resources.
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the program could be offered, the court held that tuitionsupported and voluntary summer school programs are not violative of equal protection.'"
In Bruce v. South CarolinaHigh School League,20 the court
held that a rule of the defendant league prohibiting interscholastic athletic competition for one year by students who voluntarily
transfer between schools does not violate the equal protection
clause. The league is an organization of all public high schools
and some private schools in South Carolina. It has ruled that if a
student voluntarily transfers from one high school to another
without a bona fide change in residence he is ineligible to compete
in interscholastic athletics for one year." Prior to the 1971-72
school year the plaintiff voluntarily transferred to a member
school and was thereupon declared ineligible to compete. Plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, contended that interscholastic
athletics are a fundamental segment of the public education process and that he was deprived of equal protection by the application of the league's rule. The trial court restrained enforcement
of the rule.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, rejected the
contention that high school athletics are a fundamental part of
public education.2 Instead, the court determined that athletics
are governed by the discretionary standards set by the schools
themselves and that student participation may be limited under
these standards. Treating the league as essentially a voluntary
organization, the court refused to interfere with its internal affairs
because the league's decision was not patently the result of mistake, fraud, illegality, collusion, or arbitrariness. The league applied its rule evenly to all voluntary transfers. 22.1 Thus, because
there is no constitutionally protected right to participate in inter19. 344 F. Supp. at 687; See generally McLamore v. State, 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d
250 (inter alia, state has no duty to educate prisoner), cert. denied mem., 93 S. Ct. 240
(1972).
20. 258 S.C. 546, 189 S.E.2d 817 (1972).

21. The purpose of the rule is to prevent inter-school "raiding" of high school athletes. If the transfer is made voluntarily by the student without a bona fide change of
residence, the motive for the transfer is immaterial. 258 S.C. at 550, 189 S.E.2d at 818.
22. Id. at 551, 189 S.E.2d at 819; see Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381
P.2d 718 (1963); State ex rel. Ind. High School Athletic Ass'n, v. Lawrence Cir. Ct., 240
Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959).
22.1 The court noted that when transfers result from court orders the league permits
the students to participate. 258 S.C. at 553, 189 S.E.2d at 819. Those transfers, of course,
are not necessarily voluntary. No other exceptions apparently are made.
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469

scholastic athletics, the court found no violation of equal protection.

II.

BOND FINANCING

In Harper v. Schooler13 the court considered the validity of
the bond act 24 designed to implement the Pollution Control Act. 5
In order to conform to the requirements of the Act, International
Paper Company found it necessary to construct extensive water
pollution control facilities. In accordance with the provisions of
the bond act, the Board of Commissioners of Georgetown County
and International Paper entered into a loan agreement whereby
the county authorized the issuance of $3,000,000 of revenue bonds
to fund the construction of the required facilities. International
Paper was unconditionally required to repay the loan. After full
repayment title to the facilities would vest in the corporation
upon payment of one dollar to the county.
Plaintiff's first contention was that the bonds represented a
bonded obligation within the meaning of article VIII, section 7 of
the South Carolina Constitution. 2 The court found this contention to be without merit, because under the terms of the bond act
and the loan agreement the bonds were repayable solely from
monies due under the loan agreement with International Paper.
In the court's view, the bonds and interest coupons did not constitute a monetary liability of the governmental unit or a charge
on its general credit or taxing power. 21 The court noted that in
Elliott v. McNair" it had held that the Industrial Revenue Bond
Act,29 which has similar provisions, does not violate article VIII,
section 7, and is a valid exercise of legislative power. Bond issues
in both situations are limited obligations and do not offend the
constitutional restrictions of bonded indebtedness."
23. 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.51 to -195.65 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
25. Id. 88 63-195 to -195.36.
26. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, §7, prohibits bonded indebtedness of cities or towns from
exceeding eight percent of the assessed value of the total taxable property therein and
requires a referendum for any such bond issues.
27. 258 S.C. at 492-93, 189 S.E.2d at 287-88; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.53 (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
28. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-399.21 to -399.35 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
30. The plaintiff also, asserted that the bond arrangement violated virtually every
conceivable stricture of the South Carolina Constitution including S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5;
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The court also decided that the contract provision vesting
title in the corporation upon termination of the loan agreement
did not violate the state constitutional prohibition of donating
public lands to private corporations. When under the terms of the
agreement benefits inure, or may be expected to inure, to the
state or the public, the constitutional prohibition does not
apply.3 ' The court found a public purpose and benefit even
though International Paper was required by the Pollution Control
Act to construct the facilities. Utilization of the bonds would
induce the corporation to remain in the county and would also
abate water pollution.
Plaintiff's third contention was that the delegation to the
State Budget and Control Board of the authority to approve proposed facilities 3 was a devolution of executive duties to members
of the General Assembly and thus violated the doctrine of separation of powers.3 3 The court held that there was no impermissible
delegation because the bond act was reasonably complete in itself
when it left the General Assembly, and thus the approval of facilities was a mere ministerial act not violative of the separation of
3
powers doctrine. 1
Finally, the court decided that the twenty-day statute of
limitations set by the bond act for contesting the issuance of
revenue bonds was not so short as to deny the plaintiff equal
protection and due process. 5
II.

COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS

In a per curiam decision the supreme court adopted the opinion of Circuit Judge Ness in Morris v. Scott 3 and upheld the
validity of legislation enabling Aiken County to relocate its courthouse. In 1968 the General Assembly authorized the County
art. III, §§ 13, 31; art. X, §§ 5,6. The court disposed of these arguments by noting tersely
(and, with respect to some, inappropriately) that "revenue bonds . . . are not 'bonded'
debt within the meaning of any provision of the South Carolina Constitution." 258 S.C.
at 295, 189 S.E.2d at 288.
31. 250 S.C. at 89-90, 156 S.E.2d at 428; State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C.
240, 181 S.E. 41 (1935).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.63 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
33. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
0
34. 258 S.C. at 499, 189 S.E.2d at 290; See also DeLoach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21,198
S.E. 409 (1938); But cf. Gunter v. Blanton, 259 S.C. 473, 192 S.E.2d 473 (1972), note 48
infra and accompanying text.
35. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
36. 258 S.C. 435, 189 S.E.2d 28 (1972).
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Board of Aiken County to issue general obligation bonds to construct a new courthouse. 7 A constitutional amendment, approved
by the electorate in 1968, increased the county's bonded indebtedness to an amount not to exceed fifteen percent of the assessed
value of the total taxable property in the county."8 In 1970 the
General Assembly authorized the county to relocate the courthouse within the city limits of the county seat." Plaintiff contended that this act was special legislation within the meaning
of article III, section 34 of the South Carolina Constitution4 and,
alternatively, that section 14-2 of the Code required a referendum
before the courthouse could be moved.'
The court held that section 14-2 does not necessitate a countywide referendum if the proposed relocation is within the corporate limits of the present county seat.42 The purpose underlying
this section is to provide for referenda when new counties are
formed or when county seats of existing counties are transferred
to another municipality within the county. The General Assembly, said the court, still retains the power to provide for the relocation of a courthouse within the limits of an existing county seat,
there being no constitutional limitation in this regard.4 3
The claim that Act No. 1319 of 1970 was unconstitutional
special legislation was also without merit. The 1968 legislation
authorizing the bond issue was impliedly ratified by constitutional amendment,4 4 and this legislation was sufficient in itself to
authorize the removal of the courthouse. For all practical purposes the 1970 legislation was superfluous. Furthermore, the prohibition of special legislation" is not applicable when legislation
relates to the fiscal affairs of a county or deals with local county
government. 4 The language of the constitutional provision
37. No. 1426, [1968] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3247.
38. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5(137). The amendment does not refer to the removal of
the Aiken County courthouse.
39. No. 1319, [19701 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2782.
40. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 34.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-2 (1962).
42. S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 8, reads in part as follows: "No County seat shall be
removed except by a vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors of said County voting in
an election held for that purpose . ... "
43. 258 S.C. at 440, 189 S.E.2d at 30.
44. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5(137).
45. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 34. Item IX thereunder prohibits special legislation where
a general statute can be made applicable.
46. See, e.g., Knight v. Hollings, 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E.2d 746 (1963).
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clearly implies that in many instances the exigencies of the situation require a special statute." Thus the court held that the legislation authorizing the relocation of the courthouse was not special
legislation within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
In Gunter v. Blanton" a divided court held unconstitutional
a statute giving the Cherokee County legislative delegation the
authority to approve or disapprove of any school tax increase
adopted by the Board of Trustees. In 1967 the General Assembly
consolidated the county Board of Trustees, establishing it as the
governing body of the county schools, with the power to determine the tax levy needed to operate the schools for each year.49
In 1969 the General Assembly amended the statute, with the
approval of county voters, to require that a majority of the resident members of the county legislative delegation consent to any
increase in school taxes." Four members of the court said that the
effect of the 1969 amendment was to ordain the resident legislative delegation as a committee of the General Assembly which
could not only determine when a tax increase was proper, but
could also take whatever action it deemed proper. It is clear that
the General Assembly may properly delegate the power to tax'
and to impose a millage ceiling. Nevertheless, the court held that
the statute also permitted members of the General Assembly to
sit as members of the Board of Trustees, thus assigning them an
executive role in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers."
Justice Bussey, dissenting, considered the delegation constitutionally permissible13 and the imposition of taxes by the delega47. Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939); See generally
Doran v. Robertson, 203 S.C. 434, 27 S.E.2d 714 (1943); Law v. City of Spartanburg, 148
S.C. 229, 146 S.E. 12 (1928) (statute providing for constructin of county hospital on site
to be determined by the hospital board of trustees was not invalid special legislation).
48. 259 S.C. 436, 192 S.E.2d 473 (1972). See also Survey of Taxation infra.
49. No. 685, [1967] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1383 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-1718
(Cum. Supp. 1971), as amended).
50. No. 542, [1969] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 922 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-1718
(Cum. Supp. 1971)). This statute states in part: "[N]o such tax levy shall be increased
in any year without the approval of a majority of the resident members of the Cherokee
County Legislative Delegation."
51. S.C. CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 5.
52. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Gould v. Barton, 256 S.C. 175, 181 S.E.2d 662 (1971)
(Lexington County legislative delegation's power to approve budget held unconstitutional); But see Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972), note 23 supra
and accompanying text.
53. See Stackhouse v. Floyd, 248 S.C. 183, 149 S.E.2d 437 (1966).
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tion merely a ministerial act by an arm of the General Assembly."
Historically, the practice of permitting legislative delegations to
share in the governmental process in their respective counties has
been widespread. 5 Whether the court has permitted this practice
has depended primarily upon the extent of legislative involvement in local executive decisions. 6
IV.

POWER To TAx

In United States Steel Corp. v. South Carolina Tax
7 the court held there
Commission,"
was no violation of the commerce clause when the taxpayer, whose primary source of income
in the state was derived from sales, was denied the right to elect
a tax option designed to apply to foreign corporations whose primary business in the state was manufacturing.5" Under South
Carolina law the income of every foreign corporation is allocated
to factors related to its business involvement in the state.5 9 If a
taxpayer's principal business in the state is either manufacturing
or sales, the total attributed taxable income is the average of the
following ratios:60 (1) taxpayer's property in the state to his total
property, (2) taxpayer's payroll in the state to his total payroll,
and (3) taxpayer's sales in the state to his total sales.' Prior to
1971,62 South Carolina permitted a foreign corporation whose primary business in the state was manufacturing to eliminate the
sales factor, while a corporation primarily engaged in sales could
eliminate the payroll factor and compute its net taxable income
using only the property and sales factors.
54. See Doran v. Robertson, 203 S.C. 434, 27 S.E.2d 714 (1943); Southern Ry. v. Kay,
62 S.C. 28, 39 S.E. 785 (1901).
55. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-920.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971) (legislative delegation
fixes tax levy in each school district in Greenwood County).
56. See, e.g., Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972); Gould v.
Barton, 256 S.C. 175, 181 S.E.2d 662 (1971).
57. 259 S.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 9 (1972).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-222 (Cum. Supp. 1971) reads in part: "[E]very foreign
corporation ... doing business, or having an income within the jurisdiction of this State
...shall pay annually an income tax equivalent to six percent of a proportion of its entire
net income, to be determined as provided in this chapter."
59. Id. § 65-279 et seq. (1962), as amended.
60. Id. § 65-279.3. See generally Hertz Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 246
S.C. 92, 142 S.E.2d 445 (1965).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-279.4 to -279.6 (1962), hereinafter referred to as the "property factor," the "payroll factor," and the "sales factor," respectively.
62. No. 410, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 730, effective January 1, 1971.
63. No. 50, [1958] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1574.
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The plaintiff-taxpayer, contending it was a manufacturer,
tried to claim the manufacturer's alternative for computing taxable income. Its claim was disallowed by the Tax Commission, and
after paying the tax under protest it filed suit for recovery of the
deficiency. The court first disallowed taxpayer's claim that it was
a manufacturer and not a seller because 95 per cent of its income
in South Carolina was derived from sales of steel products. For
tax purposes the technical situs of a sale is irrelevant; if property
receives benefits or protection from the state, it will have a tax
situs within the state."
The taxpayer further contended that denying it the use of the
manufacturer's alternative impermissibly discriminated against
interstate commerce. 65 The court, following Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,6 rejected this contention
because a state may properly tax a portion of the net income of
an interstate business, as long as the portion taxed is reasonably
attributable to income derived within the state, and the tax is
nondiscriminatory. 7
In response to the taxpayer's claim that he was subjected to
double taxation because part of the sales factor used by South
Carolina was also computed in the tax formula of Alabama, the
state of origin, the court said, "The fact that the amount of a
given sale has been figured in the apportionment formulas of two
states is insufficient, standing alone, to show impermissible double taxation."8
V.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY LAW

In Fuentes v. Shevin 9 the United States Supreme Court held
that claim and delivery statutes in Florida and Pennsylvania
violated due process by permitting seizure of property without a
hearing. The Florida statute, allowing a secured party to obtain
a prejudgment writ of replevin by ex parte application upon posting a bond for double the value of the property to be seized, was
64. 259 S.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 9; see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of
Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).

65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
66. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
67. Id. at 462; But cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968)
(a totally unrealistic apportionment violates both the due process and commerce clauses).
68. 259 S.C. at 160-61, 191 S.E.2d at 12; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1970).
69. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See Survey of Legislation supra.
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similar to the procedure then authorized in this state." In
Hammond v. Powell" plaintiff's household furniture was repossessed by the sheriff in accordance with the existing claim and
delivery law. Plaintiff was unable to post the required bond of
double the value of the goods seized pending the post-seizure
hearing. She thereupon filed a class action in federal district
court alleging, inter alia, a violation of due process by seizure of
her property without notice or hearing. After her complaint was
filed but before it was heard, a state court rendered final judgment and awarded title to the seized goods to the secured party.
The district court dismissed plaintiff's class action as moot. She
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
on the grounds that the controversy was not mooted by the final
judgment of the state court. The court of appeals reasoned that
when the complaint was filed the controversy was not moot and
that, due to poverty, the plaintiff and members of her class might
thereafter be subjected to similar actions under the claim and
delivery statute. Because of the substantial public interest in the
2
case, the court remanded for a hearing on the merits.
Subsequent to the Hammond decision Fuentes was announced. In response to that decision, the General Assembly
amended the claim and delivery statute to provide for notice and
the right to a pre-seizure hearing. 73 The party in possession, however, may waive his right to the hearing. 74 Moreover, if the secured party makes a showing that the collateral is probably in
immediate danger of being destroyed or concealed, the magistrate
can authorize immediate seizure prior to a hearing. 75 Although
70. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2501 to -2516 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 102504, -2505, -2507 to -2507.5 (Supp. 1972).
71. 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972).
72. Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); Washington v. Lee,
263 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Ala. 1966), afi'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2504 (Supp. 1972) reads in part:
The plaintiff shall attach to the affidavit a notice of the right to a preseizure
hearing which shall notify the defendant that within five days from service
thereof, he may demand such hearing by notifying the clerk of court in writing
and present such evidence touching upon the probable validity of the plaintiff's
claim for immediate possession, and defendant's right to continue in possession.
74. Id. § 10-2507.2 reads in part: "No property shall be seized ... unless five days'
notice and an opportunity to be heard have been afforded the party in possession. .. ."
The debtor, however, may waive the right to a pre-seizure hearing if the waiver is conspicuously displayed in the contract and includes the words "waiver of hearing prior to immediate possession."
75. Id. § 10-2507.4.
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the amended procedure has not been challenged, the waiver of
pre-seizure hearing may not pass constitutional muster in light
of the Fuentes opinion. 5
VI.

LIQUOR REGULATION

The constitutionality of the "brown bagging" law was upheld
in Winter v. Pratt,77 in which the appellant licensee made a
sweeping attack on the constitutional implications of the South
Carolina liquor statutes. In Winter the licensee's permit was suspended by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission because
of unauthorized sales of liquor to customers. The licensee attempted to employ the subterfuge that his sale of "set ups" and
purported gift of house liquor did not constitute a sale of liquor
prohibited by the statutes, but this contention was dismissed by
7
the court. 1

Under the Constitution the General Assembly has the au7
thority to regulate and license the sale of alcoholic beverages. 1
Pursuant to the provisions of the then applicable "brown bagging" law, customers were permitted to consume their own liquor
on the premises of a properly licensed business establishment."
The licensee, who operated a Columbia nightclub, was cited for
violating the liquor statutes by selling mixed drinks to his patrons. The court said that Code section 4-31,1' requiring a retailer
to be licensed, section 4-91,s2 making the sale of liquor without a
76. But cf. Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972). In
this post.Fuentes opinion, the district court said the use of self-help by a secured party
to repossess property sold under an installment sales contract was valid under Virginia
law, which allows the secured party to take possession of the collateral without judicial
intervention if it can be done without a breach of the peace. Compare Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972), with Adams v. Egley, 328 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972). See Survey of Legislation supra.
77. 258 S.C. 397, 189 S.E.2d 7, appeal dismissed mem., 93 S. Ct. 430 (1972). See
Survey of Administrative Law and Survey of Criminal Law and Procedure supra.
78. See Pirates' Cove, Inc. v. Strom, 249 S.C. 270, 153 S.E.2d 900 (1967). In that case
the same licensee involved in Winter contended that his transaction was a gift rather than
an illegal sale of liquor. The court said that a sale without a license is unlawful regardless
of the form of the transaction. See also Survey of Criminal Law and Procedure supra.
79. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 11.
80. No. 398, § 10, [1967] S.C. Acts § Jt. Res. 571 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-

29 (Cum. Supp. 1971)). This section has of course been amended by the "mini-bottle"
law, No. 1063, [19721 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2213, which was implemented by ratification
at No. 122, [19731 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 146.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-31 (1962).
82. Id. § 4-91.
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license unlawful, and article VIII, section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution, s3 which at that time prohibited the granting of
a license to sell liquor in quantities of less than one-half pint,
when read together, clearly warned the licensee that his sale of
liquor by the drink was unlawful. Thus the court held that the
statutory scheme for controlling liquor was sufficiently definite to
be constitutional.
The licensee contended that the liquor statutes, permitting
sales in quantities of one-half pint or more but prohibiting a
subsequent sale of liquor by the drink, were arbitrary, facilitated
excessive consumption, and thus violated due process. The court
rejected this contention, stating that the scope and extent of legislation, if otherwise constitutionally permissible, depend upon
the judgment of the legislature. 4 If the purpose of a statute is
based upon the state's police power, the court will presume the
propriety of the statute.8 5 Furthermore, there must be some rational relationship between the purpose of the statute and the
means chosen by the legislature to effect it. The Winter court
found a valid constitutional purpose in the regulation of liquor
and, by refusing to inquire into legislative motives, implicitly
recognized a rational relationship between that purpose and the
statutory scheme implementing it.
The court also found no impermissible burden on interstate
commerce created by the statutes regulating sales of liquor. The
twenty-first amendment reserves broad rights to the states to
regulate intoxicating liquors. 8 It is clear that regulation that
might otherwise be prohibited under the commerce clause is permissible when the commodity regulated is intoxicating liquor.
VII.

OBSCENITY

In State v. WatkinS 87 the court upheld the obscenity convic83. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 11.
84. 258 S.C. at 405, 189 S.E.2d at 10.
85. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination law was related to the police power to protect
public health).
86. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2, reads as follows: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." See Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
87. 259 S.C. 185, 191 S.E.2d 135 (1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3364
(U.S. Nov. 2, 1972) (No. 72-683).
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tion of a motion picture theater operator but declared a severable
portion of the criminal obscenity statute unconstitutional.8 8 The
defendant was indicted for exhibiting the motion picture "Anomalies" and was convicted by the uncontradicted testimony of two
witnesses that the picture showed a shameful or morbid interest
in sex going beyond customary limits of candor.89 A unanimous
court said that whether allegedly obscene matter exceeds community standards of candor is a question of fact to be decided by
the jury, subject to the scrutiny of the court."
The test of obscenity was established in Roth v. United
States' and has been expanded in subsequent decisions. The
Roth test requires three separate elements: (1) The dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal to a prurient
interest in sex; (2) the material must be patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (3) the
material must be utterly without redeeming social value.92 The
test contemplates a national rather than a local or statewide standard for obscenity.93 Perhaps in the final analysis the jury becomes the arbiter of that standard. The Watkins court said that
the motion picture, which was exhibited to the jury, was sufficient in itself to permit a determination of obscenity. 4 The court
based its decision on the dubious premise that the South Carolina
statutory test for obscenity is more stringent than the federal
88. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-414.1 to -414.9 (Cum. Supp. 1971), amending S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-414 (1962).
89. Both witnesses for the State were local merchants who had engaged in business
in the community for thirty-two and fifty years, respectively. There was no showing by
the State that either was aware of what national community standards were. Record at
13, 32.
90. Obscenity is defined by S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971) as
follows:
"Obscene" means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards,
the predominant appeal of the matter, taken.as a whole, is to prurient interest
among which is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, which
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters . ...
91. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
92. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
93. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
94. See generally Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); But cf. Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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standard.* Under the federal test the material must be patently
offensive; the state test requires that it go substantially beyond
the customary limits of candor. 5
The court, however, did hold unconstitutional a portion of
the obscenity statute that exempted from its terms those motion
pictures approved by the Motion Picture Association of America. " The power to legislate cannot be delegated to private persons or corporations. Thus, since the offensive statutory section
neither clearly established a legislative policy nor set standards
for the execution of that policy, it offended procedural due process and was held invalid. 7 Because the section was severable,
the conviction of the defendant, based on another section of the
obscenity statute, was allowed to stand.
OscAR LEE STURKEY
* [Editor's Note: After this issue had gone to press, the United States Supreme

Court promulgated its controversial new test for determining what is obscene and thus
not protected by the first amendment. Miller v. California, 41 U.S.L.W. 4925 (U.S. June
21, 1973) (5-4 decision). If sexual material is "patently offensive," appeals to prurient
interest, and depicts conduct specifically defined by statute, it "can be regulated by the
States . . . without a showing that [it] is 'utterly without redeeming social value'...."
Id. at 4931. To be considered obscene such material need only lack "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 4928 (emphasis added). Moreover, the test is
no longer based upon an illusory hypothecation of "national standards" but is intended
to be an outgrowth of "contemporary community standards" as that term is commonly
(but not legally) understood. Id. at 4929-30. The "community" envisioned by the Court
is apparently coextensive with the venire district from which the jury is selected.
It is difficult to predict the impact of this decision, if any, on the Watkins case, which
arguably was wrongly decided under the former test and is now on certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Miller unquestionably restricts the reach of first amendment protection
and thus, in the opinion of the writer, should not be retroactively applied. Nevertheless,
because the Court explained the new test as a clarification of existing law and a reaffirmation of Roth, it could vacate and remand Watkins for rephrasing consistent with that test.
Further confounding prediction is the fact that the Miller approach appears to be every
bit as vague as the test that it supplanted.]
95. 259 S.C. 185, 191 S.E.2d 135; see Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (state
definition of obscenity as "hard core pornography" was more stringent than the federal
standard and thus was permissible); But cf. Shinall v. Worrell, 319 F. Supp. 485
(E.D.N.C. 1970) (statute invalid for failing to pass constitutional muster on definition of
obscenity).
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.9 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
97. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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